In many post exploitation scenarios, attackers attempt to extract credentials from memory by targeting the LSASS process. Rather than using noisy tools like Mimikatz directly on the compromised system, more advanced adversaries often use trusted Microsoft-signed tools such as Procdump to quietly dump LSASS memory. Once they have the dump, they can move it offline and analyze it safely with tools like Mimikatz, Pypykatz, or other credential extraction utilities.
This tactic is dangerous precisely because it blends in with legitimate administrative behavior and can bypass common endpoint detection signatures. Fortunately, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint provides deep visibility through DeviceProcessEvents. With the right query, we can spot this activity early and investigate further before credentials are exfiltrated or used for lateral movement.
Here’s the query:
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "procdump.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-ma", "lsass", "lsass.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
This logic filters for executions of Procdump specifically targeting LSASS with the -ma flag, which requests a full memory dump. This type of command is rarely used in legitimate environments, especially outside of incident response or debugging contexts. When seen in a production setting, it should raise immediate concern.
What makes this query effective is that it doesn’t rely on detecting Mimikatz or alerting on post-analysis activity. Instead, it highlights the initial credential theft step: dumping LSASS. Catching this early can prevent hash extraction, pass-the-hash attacks, and privilege escalation from progressing any further.
Security teams should consider operationalizing this query in their hunting routines or converting it into a custom detection rule with high severity. This can help identify not only adversaries performing credential access, but also uncover misuse of admin tools that may have been overlooked.
In a threat landscape where stealth is the norm and living-off-the-land techniques are widespread, defenders must look for behavior, not just tools. This query provides exactly that kind of visibility.




